Backwards Christian Soldiers: The Role of the Religious Right on the Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-9/11 Era by Brown, Shannon N.
University of Washington Tacoma
UW Tacoma Digital Commons
PPPA Paper Prize Politics, Philosophy and Public Affairs
Spring 2012
Backwards Christian Soldiers: The Role of the
Religious Right on the Militarization of U.S.
Foreign Policy in the Post-9/11 Era
Shannon N. Brown
brown.shannon.n@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tacoma.uw.edu/ppe_prize
Part of the American Politics Commons
This Undergraduate Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics, Philosophy and Public Affairs at UW Tacoma Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in PPPA Paper Prize by an authorized administrator of UW Tacoma Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Brown, Shannon N., "Backwards Christian Soldiers: The Role of the Religious Right on the Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy in the











Backwards Christian Soldiers:  
The Role of the Religious Right  
on the Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy  






















Politics, Philosophy, & Economics Seminar 480 








 Brown 1 
The moral certitude of the state in wartime is a kind of fundamentalism. And this dangerous 
messianic brand of religion, one where self-doubt is minimal, has come increasingly to color the 
modern world of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.  
—Chris Hedges, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, Random House, 2003, p. 147. 
 
Although the influential role of religion in American politics is not new, its proximity to 
power is, as multiple developments over the past few decades have helped to make the Religious 
Right a particularly significant player in the militarization of U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 
era. An analysis of some of the academic literature on the subject has shown that there appears to 
be at least four important themes trending on the issue: the first being that, with the conclusion of 
the Cold War era, the Religious Right found impetus for greater political mobilization through 
strategic political and military alliances, the rise of the movement’s leadership, and its growth in 
organizational strength. Secondly, in the post-9/11 era, the movement’s proximity to power—
through the election of an evangelical president and a neoconservative alliance—helped to 
advance the Religious Right as a major player in U.S. foreign policy. Thirdly, that after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the combination of a religiously infused political 
ideology with nationalistic ideals surrounding notions of American Exceptionalism helped to 
provide the moral justification for a broader, more militaristic foreign policy agenda. Fourth, and 
lastly, that the Christian fundamentalism of the movement, tied to militaristic, right-wing politics 
after 9/11 constitutes a dangerous brand of bad theology. 
Although different sources refer to the group using various, albeit largely inter-
changeable terminology, for the purposes of this paper, the group shall most consistently be 
referred to as the “Religious Right.” To simply denote the group as the “Christian Right” or 
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“Christian evangelicals,” can be seen, in a sense, as unfairly implicating other Christian believers 
who do not share the movement’s hard-lined political views or fundamentalist interpretations of 
Biblical scripture. 
The Historical Background of the Religious Right 
To begin, for the majority of American history, Christian conservatives have remained 
adherent to the doctrine of separating the church from the state. In "The Deeper Roots of Faith 
and Foreign Policy," Andrew Preston notes that, fearing government regulation, the group had 
generally avoided involvement in the more secular concerns of politics (452). However, 
beginning in the late 1970s, largely in reaction to the liberal cultural and sexual revolutions of 
the period, the “longstanding separation of conservative religion from conservative politics 
began to erode” (452). By the 1990s, the Christian conservative “subculture” had stepped away 
from its former detachment from political affairs, and into the mainstream (453).  
The Political Mobilization of the Religious Right Through Strategic Alliances 
 
Andrew J. Bacevich expands on this history in his book The New American Militarism. 
He argues that with the cultural upheavals of the 1960s and the decline in military strength after 
the failure in Vietnam, Christian conservatives became increasingly mobilized in American 
politics. In response to the perceived threat that these events posed to the traditional American 
way of life, this paved the way for the group’s adoption of a “crusade theory of warfare” for U.S. 
foreign policy—essentially comprising a view that mandated the combination of national 
security interests with the use of force as a means for fulfilling a religiously imbued moral 
imperative (135). This moral imperative heralds back to the Wilsonian paradigm that a “world 
remade in America’s image” is a world at peace, along with the certainty that America’s mission 
is a providential one (10). In order for this religious imperative to be achieved, such thinking 
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demanded a reconstitution of U.S. military power and a more aggressive reconfiguration of the 
traditional concept of “just war”—both essential to the militarization of U.S. policy (135).  
Bacevich supports this argument by noting that these ideas were able to bear fruit after 
the end of the Cold War Era, when the Republican Party (with its emphasis on patriotism and 
“traditional values”) found favor with the Religious Right (136). Beginning under the Reagan 
administration, each side perceived its own benefit with the alliance: the Republicans were able 
to advance the military build-up and their national security agenda after the war, while the 
evangelicals regarded it as a way to “reclaim and reshape [the U.S.’s] destiny” (137-138). Thus, 
Bacevich argues that, with this alliance and the revival of Wilsonian ideals following the 
conclusion of the Cold War, military power has come to be seen as the instrument with which the 
creation of a new international order could be facilitated.  
Bacevich’s second key supporting argument for the role of the Religious Right in the 
militarization of U.S. foreign policy deals with the evangelical commitment to the restoration of 
“traditional” American values through a second alliance, this time with the armed services. To 
counteract the internal threat posed by the cultural shifts of the late 20th century, it was 
perceived that, by promoting such military values as “duty, honor, and country,” moral renewal 
could be facilitated at home (140). By restoring the American way of life, evangelicals could 
“reverse the tide of godlessness and social decay” and ensure that the U.S. adhered to its 
providential mission (124). As they too felt the negative repercussions of the ongoing culture 
war, the military recognized the benefits of sharing a common cause with the Religious Right, 
whose support added significantly to their efforts to rebuild American military power after 
Vietnam (140-141). Bacevich supports the strategic power of this notion through the example 
that, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the accommodating stamp on use of force was 
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ultimately used to justify a preventative war as a war against “evil” (145). Again, this signaled a 
willingness to reinterpret the just-war theory in accordance with the infallibility of American 
interests and to advance its providential mission. 
At the same time, Bacevich notes that the militarization of U.S. policy and the 
imperialistic advancement of the American vision abroad has occurred with little to no debate as 
to whether or not such militarism may be contradictory to founding American principles such as 
freedom and democracy (14). Consensual support by mainstream Republican politicians (and the 
public alike), in combination with a consensus that American military supremacy serves as an 
affirmation of American exceptionalism, has contributed to the propagation of a militarized U.S. 
foreign policy (15). Bacevich cites the example of Senator John Kerry in his 2004 run for the 
presidency against incumbent George W. Bush. Instead of questioning the national security 
consensus surrounding the “war on terror,” Kerry focused on painting himself as equally 
militaristic and “sound of defense” by arguing against the tactics of the war rather than the 
principles (15). However, support for this militaristic doctrine, Bacevich argues, fails to uphold 
traditional American roots and principles. He supports this idea by disputing that, in the 
alignment of the ends of the Wilsonian paradigm with the militarization of U.S. policy as the 
means for implementing a providential mission, “we have chosen to…[rely] on force and the 
threat of force to spread the American Way of Life” (33). 
Political Mobilization: The Role of Religious Leaders and Grassroots Organizing  
 
 In a 1999 edition of Foreign Policy, William Martin also emphasizes that American 
religious conservatives no longer adhere to the separation of the church from the state. In fact, he 
notes that their political activism does not even stop at the water’s edge anymore as the Religious 
Right has played a growing role in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy 
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(67). Not only does he point out that white evangelicals comprise around 25 percent of all 
registered voters, but he also notes the fact that American religious leaders are playing an 
increasingly vocal role in addressing foreign policy issues (68). Thus, he argues that, although 
the Religious Right is not a mainstream movement, it is not a marginal one either. 
 He claims that, in the 1980s, religious groups and their leaders came to the forefront of 
American politics with “better organization, greater political sophistication, and stronger 
connections to Washington insiders” (69). Most visible among these groups were leaders like 
Reverend Jerry Falwell, with his Moral Majority; televangelist and founder of the Christian 
Coalition, Pat Robertson; or radio-broadcaster, James Dobson, with Focus on the Family. Martin 
argues that these religious opinion leaders “recognize that they are in the minority but 
compensate for their modest—though hardly negligible—numbers through mobilization and 
organization” (69). Using radio broadcasts, television, and the Internet, these individuals are able 
to reach and mobilize their millions of viewers on a daily basis. At the same time, their highly 
sophisticated level of group organization enables them to identify supporters, to set up networks 
for communication, form organizations to rally around their candidates, and to build support to 
get out the vote. In fact, in 1980, after Ronald Reagan won the Presidency by a surprising 
margin, even the media attributed the Republican victory to the organizational influence of the 
movement (Robinson and Wilcox 6). “The ability to mobilize the electorate rapidly,” says 
Martin, “coupled with an effective lobbying apparatus, has endowed the Religious Right with a 
level of influence that is unique in American politics” (69).  
 One notable example of the influence of the Religious Right on American politics, as 
Martin points out, is the fact that the Christian Coalition has been distributing voter guides and 
congressional “scorecards” prior to every election since 1990 (70). These purportedly 
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nonpartisan scorecards rank various candidates according to their voting history, and whether or 
not their positions are in-line with the Coalition’s on various issues. However, filing a lawsuit 
against the Coalition, the Federal Elections Committee argued that the organization was 
“illegally influencing elections” with its cards, as they “consistently gave the highest marks to 
Republicans” (70). The court ruled in favor of the Coalition, stating in 1999, that “‘express 
advocacy’ would only apply to an ‘explicit directive’ that ‘unmistakably exhort[s] the 
reader/viewer/listener to take electoral action to support the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate’” (Glasser and Miller). Likewise, it is evidentiary that such sophisticated 
leadership and organized grassroots efforts give the Religious Right a vast and significant level 
of influence when it comes to the political arena. 
The Religious Right and its Proximity to Power: An Evangelical President 
 
The second theme in this relationship between the Religious Right and the militarization 
of U.S. foreign policy is the newfound access to power that the movement found after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. In an article titled “God Is Not Neutral: Religion and U.S. Foreign 
Policy,” Andrew J. Bacevich and co-author Elizabeth H. Prodromou argue that after 9/11, 
“conceptions of justice, largely evangelical in their origin, became fused with a set of policy 
prescriptions aimed at transforming U.S. national security strategy” (44). Religion was used as 
an “instrument…to provide moral justification for what is, in effect, a strategy of empire” (44). 
The personal theology of President George W. Bush and his religiously infused political 
ideology becomes particularly significant in this light.  
Although raised in a Christian home, it was not until President Bush was in his 40s that 
his faith found a central role in his life. Indeed he is quoted as acknowledging: ‘‘There is only 
one reason I am in the Oval Office and not in a bar…I found faith. I found God” (46). Bacevich 
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and Prodromou argue that, not only was the way Bush communicated laced with religious 
language and imagery, but his personal theology also gave him “confidence in his own ability to 
discern good from evil” (46). Thus, President Bush’s personal faith and moral outlook served as 
a powerful framework for crafting his administration’s response to the attacks of 9/11, ultimately 
leading up to his open-ended “crusade” on terror. Expressing his Manichean worldview in 
either/or terms, Bush heralded the “war on terror” as a “monumental struggle between good and 
evil,” and warned other nations that “you’re either with us or against us” (48). Bacevich and 
Prodromou note the implications of such dichotomous thinking:  
[Bush’s] faith assured him that as the elected leader of the United States he was acting in 
a manner that was consistent with the good and that accorded with God’s will…This 
conviction invested Bush with an unshakable confidence that his decisions were 
fundamentally sound. (48-49) 
The problem with Bush’s faith, then, is not only that it compares the U.S.’s calling with 
God’s will, but that it leaves little room for retrospection, or for the examination of other 
possibilities and their potential consequences. Bacevich and Prodromou express their concern in 
this regard, by pointing out the fact that Jesus Christ preached a doctrine of love, mercy, 
forgiveness, and forbearance (50). However, in the “blending of religion and statecraft that 
became the war on terror,” they note that these values were largely absent. “Bush promised not 
mercy but retribution. ‘Whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies,’ 
he promised the Congress on September 20, 2001, ‘justice will be done’” (50). 
Proximity to Power: A Post-9/11 Neoconservative Alliance 
Of further interest in the theme regarding the militarization of foreign policy and the 
Religious Right’s proximity to power was the alliance that ensued with the hawkish, right-wing 
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neoconservatives, who were so highly represented within the Bush administration. Some of these 
noteworthy individuals included Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and think-tank leader and founder of 
the Weekly Standard (the neocon bible), William Kristol. Neocons are generally noted for a 
common set of characteristics: their belief in the human condition as a struggle between “good” 
and “evil”; for their value of American military superiority as evidentiary of American 
exceptionalism; for their willingness to use military force to protect American interests and 
advance their agenda; and for their focus on the Middle East as the “primary theater for 
American overseas power” (Urban 78).  
Bacevich and Prodromou claim in their second argument that for these neoconservative 
ideologues, who “tend toward a secular version of fundamentalism,” 9/11 represented not a fight 
of good versus evil, but of “democracy against dictatorship” (50). Having long touted the 
righteousness of a “benevolent American hegemony,” and favoring the use of military power as 
the instrument needed to promote American values and interests around the world, the neocons 
found 9/11 to be a strategic (albeit tragic) opportunity to implement their own foreign policy 
agenda (51). Bacevich and Prodromou point out, for example, that just a little over a year later, 
the administration released its National Security Strategy—constituting a “veritable manifesto” 
reformulating U.S. policy after the 9/11 attacks (53). Again, the Strategy employed religious 
language and imagery, imbuing it with a moral authority that “reaffirm[ed] America’s purpose to 
‘rid the world of evil’” (53).  
It follows then that, as Bacevich and Prodromou ask, one must question “what are the 
implications of this marriage between presidential faith and secular ideology in a time of national 
and international crisis?” (54) They conclude that, firstly it will contribute to the ongoing 
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propensity to instrumentalize religion in politics. Secondly, by lending a moral justification to 
American efforts, the combination will be used to further the expansion of a Pax-Americana 
empire. And thirdly, that by making the “use of force synonymous with liberation and the 
overthrow of evil,” it will reinforce the further militarization of U.S. foreign policy (54). 
Religious Nationalism: American Exceptionalism in the Post-9/11 Era 
 
A third theme common to the study of religion and militarism in the post-9/11 era is that, 
after the terrorist attacks, religion was used as a moral justification for a broader, more 
militaristic foreign policy agenda through nationalist symbolism and notions of American 
exceptionalism. In a journal article titled “American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from 
September 11 to the Iraq War,” Paul T. McCartney argues that deeply rooted nationalist themes 
provided the framework within which Americans responded to and comprehended the terrorist 
attacks. “[These] strikes,” he says, “provided a rare clarifying moment in the nation’s collective 
consciousness, when both American national identity and U.S. foreign policy were 
reinvigorated…and a national focus…absent since the end of the Cold War, reemerged” (400). 
By blending the “legitimating power” of nationalism with the perpetual use of lofty and 
moralistic terms to interpret and characterize the attacks, the Bush administration “laid the 
groundwork in the American consciousness” for an ambitious and militaristic foreign policy 
agenda (400). 
McCartney also notes that the American national identity finds its foundation in a 
conviction that American principles are “rooted in qualities and capacities shared by all people, 
everywhere” (402). Implied within such notions of American exceptionalism is a crusading 
mentality, a sense of duty to spread our national values and ideals. That in the battle of the “war 
on terror,” it is the U.S.’s particular mission to spread the “light” of freedom in a world of 
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“darkness” and terror. McCartney contends that such an American “civil religion” serves to 
function as the religious expression of American nationalism:  
Civil religion allows Americans to express in the language of transcendence that the 
United States is an exceptional country and that the American people have a providential 
destiny. A certain unshakable confidence attaches to foreign policies that are believed to 
be not only approved by God, but perhaps even required by His inscrutable plan for 
mankind. (404) 
It is in this consideration, where the role of President Bush demands a second examination in the 
formulation of the U.S.’s post-9/11 foreign policy agenda.  
The Bush Administration—Linking Nationalist and Religious Fundamentalism  
 
McCartney points out that it was ultimately President Bush who focused the American 
mission after September 11th, particularly through his articulation of patriotic sentiments with 
religious language. By defining the world in Manichean terms, with the U.S. symbolizing the 
“good,” Bush added an implicit moral justification to the administration’s policies, while 
preparing the American public to accept its broader foreign policy agenda (408). For example, in 
a speech on September 12th, Bush stated that, “Freedom and democracy are under attack…. This 
enemy attacked not just our people, but freedom-loving people everywhere in the world…. This 
will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good will prevail” (399). Thus, his 
strategy in framing the attacks not only served to provide the American people with reassurance 
during a time of crisis, but it also gave the administration a vague and open-ended opportunity to 
shape the nation’s grand strategy in foreign policy (408).  
 Likewise, the belief in such American Exceptionalism during the “war on terror” not only 
provided the key to fulfilling the U.S.’s providential mission, but it also paved the way for the 
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Bush Doctrine of unilateralism, preemptive war, and the supercession of international law. 
McCartney argues that the grand vision for America’s global role in the post-9/11 world 
culminated in the administration’s National Security Strategy, released in September 2002 (415). 
The general theme read along the lines of the following statement: “‘Today, humanity holds in 
its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over [its] foes. The United States 
welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission’” (416). Thus, by marshalling 
nationalist symbolism in support of their goals, the Bush administration was able to spell out a 
broader foreign policy agenda, while using religion and American exceptionalism to ascribe to it 
a notion of moral authority (420). 
A second author, Hugh B. Urban, also writes on the crucial role of President Bush in the 
alliance between the religious fundamentalism of the Christian Right with the hawkish, political 
fundamentalism of secular neoconservatives—with this bond between religious and secular 
fundamentalism comprising the fourth, and final theme. In a journal article titled "Machiavelli 
Meets the Religious Right,” Urban contends that “President Bush represents the structural link 
that ties together the two major factions in his administration: the strong religious agenda of the 
New Christian Right, and the imperialist military agenda of the Neoconservatives” (95). 
Adopting what David Domke has termed as a type of "political fundamentalism," Urban notes 
that President Bush has furthered the “intertwining of conservative religious faith, politics, and 
strategic communication" (77). Indeed, he points out that Domke has found that President Bush 
used explicit religious language in his public speeches more often than any other president in 
U.S. history (89).  
In spite of the link between the two factions, Urban notes that the neoconservatives are 
not a particularly religious group; rather that they merely recognize “that religion, particularly in 
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its most extreme fundamentalist forms, is a powerful political tool and a means to generate 
intense nationalist sentiment” (79). For example, part of President Bush’s 2000 campaign 
strategy formulated by his neoconservative strategist Karl Rove, included an effort to project an 
image of Bush as a “compassionate conservative” who could “woo powerhouse evangelical 
pastors and Christian right leaders to [his] side” (89). As Urban mentions, also common within 
the neoconservative ideology is the belief that a strong leader might sometimes choose to take 
extreme or unpleasant actions. Cheney, himself, summed up such sentiments through his 
statement that in the “war on terror,” the U.S. must operate within "the dark side," while using 
"any means at its disposal" to defeat its enemies (92). Furthermore, in a return to the imperial 
presidency, the Bush administration’s expansion of presidential powers and disregard for 
international law has also shown consistencies with a Machiavellian belief system where the 
“ends justify the means.” Urban claims that the administration’s policies were “rooted in a kind 
of religious faith…in America's exceptional status as a divinely guided nation and in [the] 
President's exceptional position as a divinely appointed leader, one who is above public scrutiny, 
congressional oversight, and even international law” (95). 
Fundamentalist Religion and the Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
Of further significance for the study of the Religious Right and militarism, is the fact that 
in a 2008 study on “‘Messianic’ Militarism and Political Conflict in the United States," David 
Barker et al. have determined that a positive correlation exists between Christian fundamentalism 
and militancy, with militarism being defined as a “willingness to use the U.S. military to defend 
and protect American interests abroad” (309). They found that Christian fundamentalism and its 
corollaries encourage aggressive foreign policy postures both directly (even when controlling for 
nationalism), and indirectly, by promoting greater nationalism (again while controlling for a 
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variety of related factors) (318-319). These related factors include cognitive dogmatism (or 
“black and white” thinking), hierarchical visions of authority, religious devotionalism, 
immersion in evangelical culture, attitudes toward the Middle East, and party identification 
(319). Finding that biblical inerrancy, cognitive dogmatism, and hierarchical visions of authority 
are all significant predictors of nationalism, they also found that individuals who profess the 
inerrancy of the Bible are particularly militaristic when it comes to the defense of Israel, beyond 
that which can be predicted from a generalized sense of militarism (318). At the same time they 
discovered that traditionalistic believers are more likely, relative to individuals without such an 
orientation, to base their vote choices on matters of foreign policy—even when considering 
stringent controls (319). Particularly interesting, however, is the fact that, by summing two 
variables that measure church attendance and the frequency of prayer, they found that “religious 
devotionalism, as distinct from any of the elements of fundamentalism, is marginally associated 
with less nationalism” (319). 
This relationship between militarism and Christian fundamentalism is further supported 
in a 2008 study by Jody C. Baumgartner et al. on “The Influence of Religion on Public Opinion 
of U.S Foreign Policy in the Middle East.” Even after overall public support for the war had 
dropped, the study used data on public opinion regarding the Iraq War from surveys done by the 
Pew Research Center. The group concluded that evangelicals more strongly supported the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East, and also that their support following the 2003 
invasion has declined at a much slower rate than it has with the general public, even when 
including Americans with other religious beliefs (177). “Most impressive, however, is that this 
relationship holds even after controlling for the respondents' party identification” (176). 
Fundamentalism and Radicalized Christianity 
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 In his book, American Fascists, Chris Hedges argues that the politicization of faith among 
the Religious Right constitutes a form of religious fascism: 
Both the best of American democracy and the best of Christianity embody important 
values such as compassion, tolerance, and belief in justice and equality…. These values, 
democratic and Christian, are being dismantled, often with stealth, by a radical Christian 
movement, known as dominionism, which seeks to cloak itself in the mantle of the 
Christian faith and American patriotism. (10) 
This group within the Religious Right, he notes, is “comfortable with this darker vision of an 
intolerant, theocratic America. Unfortunately, it is this minority that is taking over the machinery 
of U.S. state and religious institutions” (19). These hawkish fundamentalists preach that 
Christians are to build the kingdom of God in the here and now, and see the U.S. as a blessed 
agent of God. Hedges notes that they tend to speak in the language of battle and paint 
apocalyptic scenes, finding their final aesthetic in war (33). 
 Another radicalized group within the Religious Right are individuals who tout a religious 
doctrine called “premillenial dispensationalism.” In The New American Militarism, Andrew J. 
Bacevich reports that such Christian fundamentalists essentially hold that before biblical 
prophesy is to be fulfilled, there will be a great end of days tribulation in which Israel plays a 
prominent role (131). These fundamentalists have taken it upon themselves, however, to ensure 
that such eschatological events stay on track by espousing a belief in the U.S. as a divine agent, 
while unwaveringly serving to protect the interests of the Israeli state (133). 
Backwards Christian Soldiers: Formulating A Moral Response to 9/11 
 
In his piece “Be Not Afraid: A Moral Response to Terrorism,” Jim Wallis argues that 
although September 11 shattered American notions of invulnerability and resulted in a foreign 
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policy rooted in fear, it could have served as a teachable moment instead. On September 12, 
2001, Wallis crafted a statement in response to the terrorist attacks, titled “Deny Them Their 
Victory: A Religious Response to Terrorism.” Within two weeks of releasing it, over five 
thousand religious leaders had signed on to it (91). In it he called on his fellow Americans to 
“make the right choices in this crisis—to pray, act, and unite against the bitter fruits of division, 
hatred, and violence. Let us rededicate ourselves to global peace, human dignity, and the 
eradication of the injustice that breeds rage and vengeance” (92). He also notes that we cannot 
adequately comprehend the terrorist attacks of 9/11 without a careful examination of the 
“grievances and injustices felt by millions of people around the world” (96) 
Jon Pahl also writes that the attacks should have been a time for national self-criticism, 
rather than assuming our own innocence (170). He points out the fact that the attacks were 
calculated for their maximum symbolic impact, focusing on two architectural symbols of 
Western neocapitalism and military dominance: the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon 
(170). However, by marshalling the religious language of sacrifice and the language of 
mission—for example, calling U.S. military adventures “Operation Infinite Justice” or 
“Operation Enduring Freedom”—the Bush administration “sought through euphemism to cloak 
in religious innocence a history of U.S. complicity in creating the very enemies that it now 
intended to destroy” (168). Even after wrapping the war in prayer—through Reverend Pat 
Robertson’s “Operation Pray Shield,” for example—we again attempted to render ourselves 
innocents, on the side of the Lord. “Needless to say, Jesus’ recommendation to ‘pray for those 
who persecute you’ or to ‘love your enemies’ did not make an appearance here” (169).  
Backwards Christian Soldiers: Bad Theology 
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In his piece titled “Dangerous Religion,” Jim Wallis argues that, in its promotion of 
American militarism over the past few decades, the Religious Right has interpreted scripture out 
of context, and fails to address the contradictions and inconsistencies within its views. Although 
many Christians believe that the Bible is without error, they do not necessarily believe that every 
word should be taken literally, nor that one may select scripture out-of-context to support their 
views. Of particular concern for Wallis, in this regard, has been the role of President Bush, as 
both the head of state and figurehead for the movement. He rightly contends that a president who 
believes that “the nation is fulfilling a God-given righteous mission and that he serves with a 
divine appointment can become quite theologically unsettling” (250). 
Hence, Wallis says, the problem with President Bush’s use of rhetoric to infuse religion 
into statecraft is that his quotes taken from the Bible or religious hymns are either taken out of 
context or used in ways that do not reflect their original meaning (251). For example, Bush is 
quoted as having stated that, "This ideal of America is the hope of all mankind…. That hope still 
lights our way. And the light shines in the darkness. And the darkness has not overcome it." 
Those last two sentences are straight out of the Book of John, but in the gospel, the light shining 
in the darkness is Jesus Christ. It is not related in any way to America or its values (251). “Bush 
seems to make this mistake over and over again,” says Wallis, “confusing nation, church, and 
God. The resulting theology is more American civil religion than Christian faith” (251-252). 
Furthermore, in his conviction that we are engaged in a moral battle between good and evil, by 
speaking of ourselves as representing the “good,” and everyone else as being on the “wrong side 
in that divine confrontation,” this constitutes a bad form of theology. It also “rules out self-
reflection and correction” and “covers over the crimes America has committed, which [have] led 
to widespread global resentment against us” (252). Wallis reveals that even Christianity Today 
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has noted that, “by confusing genuine faith with national ideology,” President Bush’s faith "does 
not give him pause or force him to reflect. It is a source of comfort and strength but not of 
wisdom" (250). Wallis argues that, instead, we need to ask ourselves “whether we are on God’s 
side, rather than the other way around” (Wallis “Be Not Afraid” 97). 
In Response  
In conclusion, by labeling the Religious Right as an irrational and reactive movement, 
one fails to address the political astuteness and sophistication of the group. However, when 
considering the militarization of U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 era, the role of the 
movement has been largely understated. During this period, with the movement’s increased 
political mobilization and proximity to power, it has contributed to a combination of religious 
and secular fundamentalism, by infusing religion and nationalism into statecraft. The influential 
role of the Religious Right on the militarization of U.S. foreign policy has shown that in an age 
of increasingly intertwined domestic and international issues, religion holds a heightened 
relevance for the assimilation of foreign policy issues. 
Furthermore, such “messianic militarism” fails to address its contradiction with Jesus’ 
ultimate message of love and forgiveness, and not to mention, peace. For example, in the Gospel 
of Matthew, when asked what is the greatest commandment, Jesus replied that it is simply to, 
“Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind…the 
second [greatest commandment] is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself’” (English Standard 
Version, Matt. 22.37-38). In this requirement to love one’s neighbor, the term “neighbor” is an 
indiscriminate reference to all men and represents the highest order of selfless love. “When we 
love our neighbor, we do not love ‘the other I’, but the ‘you’. One's neighbor is the absolutely 
unrecognizable distinction between man and man; it is eternal equality before God—enemies, 
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too, have this equality” (Kierkegaard 79). Indeed, this idea is also rooted in the scripture of 
Matthew 5:43-44 where Jesus states, “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your 
neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who 
persecute you.” In Romans 12:19-20, Jesus further builds upon this relationship:  
Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave it to the wrath of God, for it is written,  
“Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord.” To the contrary, “if your enemy is 
hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him something to drink; for by so doing you will 
heap burning coals on his head.” 
To put it simply, Jesus’ admonition to “love your neighbor” does not only apply to our like-
minded fellows, but to our enemies as well.  
Unfortunately, with their dogmatic messages of intolerance and hard-lined politics, the 
Religious Right has overlooked the loving and peaceful message of Jesus’ gospel, by promoting 
a militaristic and nationalistic brand of American theocracy. However, not all Christians 
appreciate nor share their views. For example, an even earlier evangelical American President, 
Jimmy Carter, emphasized the need to make peace a priority, often directly citing Jesus’ 
beatitude in Matthew 5:9: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God” 
(Berggren and Rae 617). Carter is also quoted as having said that, if the United States is to be the 
democratic model or light to the world, “The best way, I think, to induce other people to adopt 
our own persuasion in democratic principles is to make our own system work” (619). In 
conclusion, if Christians truly want to reflect the light of Jesus into the world, they need to cast 
off such mentalities as the Religious Right and embrace the pursuit of social and economic 
justice, political and religious diversity, and the primacy of human rights and multilateral 
cooperation in foreign policy. 
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